Mohammed A. Salih, Foreign Policy Research Institute
On March 10, Syrian interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa and Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) General Commander Mazloum Abdi signed an eight point agreement which been widely celebrated as a step toward rebuilding Syria’s post-Assad regime state. However, the agreement remains a broad declaration of principles, leaving the specifics of implementation to technical bilateral committees.
However, the declaration of the country's interim constitution on March 13 raises questions about the implementation of the landmark Sharaa-Abdi deal, as key items in that agreement regarding the recognition of Kurds and their rights were not explicitly included in the interim constitution. It also remains unclear how the deal will be incorporated into Damascus’ governing plan for the transitional period.
Nevertheless, the March 10 agreement was significant as a document for several reasons.
First, within the broader historical context of Syrian-Kurdish relations, the agreement marks the first time the Syrian state has acknowledged the Kurdish question at such a high level. This is particularly significant given that Kurdish political activism, language, and cultural practices have long been illegal or unrecognized in post-independence Syria—though at times tolerated in limited ways. The first point of the agreement “guarantees the right of all Syrians to political participation and representation.” The second point recognizes “the Kurdish community as an authentic community in the Syrian state,” however, this clause was not carried over to the interim constitution. The agreement’s assertion that it “guarantees the right to citizenship and all constitutional rights,” are particularly important for Kurds as this could pave the way to granting citizenship to approximately 300,000 Syrian Kurds who were rendered stateless by an unjust 1962 census. But neither the Sharaa-Abdi agreement nor the interim constitution explicitly addresses this. The agreement’s fifth point, guaranteeing the return of displaced Syrians to their homes, is also crucial for Kurds, many of whom were forcibly displaced, especially from Afrin and Sere Kaniye, now controlled by Turkish-backed groups.
The deal might signal Damascus’s willingness to grant citizenship to approximately 300,000 Syrian Kurds who were rendered stateless by an unjust 1962 census. The agreement’s fifth point, guaranteeing the return of displaced Syrians to their homes, is also crucial for Kurds, many of whom were forcibly displaced, especially from Afrin and Sere Kaniye, now controlled by Turkish-backed groups. While these provisions are broad and open to interpretation, they suggest that Kurds will, in principle, be entitled to participate in Syria’s post-Assad political process and that their rights could be enshrined in an interim and possibly a permanent constitution. This is important given Sharaa’s deliberate exclusion of Kurds from some of his recent political initiatives, such as the national dialogue conference and the constitutional drafting committee.
The agreement also recognizes the Kurdish political role in Syria for the first time at an official level and legitimizes Gen. Abdi. However, the agreement, just as the interim constitution, does not explicitly legalize Kurdish language and culture, nor does it include any provisions for local self-rule in Kurdish-majority areas of northeastern and northern Syria, a key Kurdish demand. Additionally, the Sharaa government’s approach warrants caution. While Sharaa has dismantled key symbols and institutions of the former Assad regime—including the constitution, flag, cabinet, and military-security apparatus—he has retained the state’s official title as the “Syrian Arab Republic.” This phrasing was also retained in the interim constitutional declaration, raising concerns about his commitment to an inclusive national identity and whether he genuinely intends to move beyond Arab nationalist rhetoric. Overall, Kurdish political activism in Syria is constrained by the non-contiguous nature of Kurdish-majority areas, a reality exacerbated by the state’s demographic engineering policies, mainly under the Arab Belt project of the 1960s.
Secondly, the agreement also unfolds against the backdrop of renewed peace efforts between Turkey and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). On February 27, PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan called on the PKK and its affiliates to disarm. While the SDF is not formally part of the PKK, its core elements—the People’s Protection Units (YPG) and its political wing, the Democratic Union Party (PYD)—are linked to the broader Kurdistan Democratic Communities Union (KCK), of which the PKK is a primary component. General Abdi denied any connection between Ocalan’s statement and the SDF, but Turkey’s persistent opposition to the SDF and its desire for its dissolution remain key factors that must be considered. In connection with that, the agreement’s call for integrating SDF forces within Syrian security forces could prove tricky in practice. It does not appear that the SDF would agree to have its elements integrated into Syrian state forces on an individual basis; instead, it would likely insist on maintaining SDF divisions within the new state while retaining some of their current command and control structures. The interim constitution’s ban, in Article 9, on all armed factions except the official Syrian army will certainly increase tensions between Damascus and Kurds.
As some observers have pointed out should the Sharaa-Abdi agreement lead to Kurdish political rights, including language recognition or administrative decentralization, Syria could become more progressive on Kurdish issues than Turkey. This could prompt Ankara to pressure Damascus into limiting concessions to Kurds, especially if Turkey’s talks with the PKK collapse. If Turkey refuses to recognize Kurdish rights domestically, it is unlikely to tolerate such recognition in neighboring Syria where it has major influence over the new rulers in Damascus. The interplay between Turkey’s internal Kurdish dynamics and its stance on Syria remains a crucial factor in the agreement’s implementation.
Thirdly, another critical dimension of the agreement is its timing. It follows sectarian violence in Syria’s Alawite-majority coastal regions, where forces linked to Sharaa’s government massacred civilians from non-Sunni Muslim groups. This violence severely undermined Sharaa’s efforts to unify the country. Striking a deal with the SDF allows him to present himself as a leader who can bridge sectarian and ethnic divisions. However, the interim constitution is likely to erode the fragile trust that had emerged between Sharaa and the SDF, given the unanimous Syrian Kurdish rejection of the document as a blueprint for a new form of authoritarianism in Syria and its failure to recognize Kurdish rights.
Sharaa’s government currently lacks the strength to reassert control over all Syrian territory. The SDF, backed by the United States, controls nearly one-third of Syria. In the south, Druze and former Free Syrian Army rebels in Suwayda and Deraa resist Damascus, with support from Israel, the UAE, and Russia. Additionally, unrest in Alawite areas signals an emerging insurgency, potentially backed by Iran, Hezbollah, and factions within Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). Given these challenges, securing an agreement with the SDF is a pragmatic move for Sharaa, allowing him to consolidate power while navigating a volatile political landscape.
Fourth, the deal reportedly has U.S. backing, reflecting Washington’s interest in stabilizing Syria and ensuring a political role for the SDF, possibly as part of a broader strategy to facilitate an eventual U.S. troop withdrawal. However, the agreement’s fate hinges on several factors, including the balance of power between Damascus and the SDF by the end of 2025, when the details are expected to be finalized.
The presence of U.S. forces in Syria will be a crucial factor. If the U.S. withdraws and peace talks between Turkey and the PKK collapse, both Damascus and Ankara might feel emboldened to take military action against the SDF. In such a scenario, the only deterrent could be continued instability in Syria, a weakened Damascus facing Iranian-backed insurgency, and Israeli intervention.
The history of the Iraqi Kurdish struggle offers valuable lessons. The Sharaa-Abdi deal almost coincided with the 55th anniversary of the March 11, 1970, autonomy agreement between Kurdish leader Mullah Mustafa Barzani and Baghdad. At the time, Iraq, weakened by prolonged conflict and economic instability, granted Kurds unprecedented recognition. However, within four years, the deal collapsed when then-Vice President Saddam Hussein traded territorial concessions with Iran in exchange for crushing Kurdish resistance. The Syrian Kurds and the SDF are likely mindful of this history as they negotiate with Damascus.
Ultimately, while the Sharaa-Abdi agreement is a milestone for Syria and its Kurdish population, it is far from a resolution, particularly given that its key provisions for Kurds were not included in the interim constitution approved by Sharaa. Its success will hinge on Syria’s evolving domestic power dynamics, regional geopolitical rivalries, and the extent to which the parties can agree on the specifics of its implementation in the transitional period and beyond. Syria’s complex political landscape warrants cautious optimism—emphasizing caution above all.
Dr. Mohammed A. Saih is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow in the National Security Program at the Philadelphia-based Foreign Policy Research Institute. He has written extensively on Middle Eastern and Kurdish affairs for two decades, contributing to various international media outlets, think tanks, and scholarly publications. He is on X @MohammedASalih.